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RECENT DECISIONS
admissible, for the word "divulge" in the section has not been inter-
preted as referring to admissibility. Nevertheless it is certainly
within the province of the Supreme Court's duties to formulate rules
of evidence for the federal court system; the Court has "from the
very beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be ap-
plied in federal criminal prosecutions," 36 and viewed in this light,
the Nardone case is more easily supportable.
However, as was pointed out in Schwartz v. Texas, section 605
was not intended to change state rules of evidence. The first Court
of Appeals decision in the instant case would have that effect in cer-
tain instances.3 7 That decision may be viewed as an extension of the
previous extensions outlined above. It is submitted that perhaps the
breaking point has been reached.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - VENUE - REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY
FOR TRANSFER UNDER SECTION 1404(a) OF THE JUDICIAL CODE.-
In two cases 1 before the Supreme Court respondents (plaintiffs)
served process and brought actions in federal district courts having
jurisdiction and proper venue over the adverse parties. The adverse
parties (defendants), showing "convenience" and "interests of
justice," moved for transfer under Section 1404(a) of the Judicial
Code.2 They admitted that the proposed transferee forums did not
originally have venue, but claimed that the clause "where [the action]
might have been brought" should not apply solely to the time of the
bringing of the action, but also to any subsequent time, when, by
their waiver of lack of venue, the proposed transferee forum would
be one where the action "might then have been brought." Petitioners,
both district court judges, granted the motions for transfer, but the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,3 in mandamus proceedings,
36 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
%7 These instances would be where federal court intervention would prevent
the further violation of § 605, as by the divulgence of the wiretaps, and non-
intervention would result in irreparable injury to petitioner. See Pugach v.
Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1960).
'Hoffman v. Blaski, Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335 (1960) (The
cases, numbered 25 and 26 respectively, were treated in one opinion by the
majority of the Court, but Justice Frankfurter wrote separate dissenting
opinions.).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958). The section reads: "For the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.'
3 In the Hoffman case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had
already determined that § 1404(a) applied. Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737
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remanded the actions to the transferor forums. The Supreme Court,
affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals on certiorari, held that
a forum is one where the action "might have been brought" only if
the plaintiff could have brought the action there in the first instance
independently of the wishes or any subsequent action by the defendant.
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
Admittedly, the doctrine of forum non conveniens was the basis
of the legislative formulation of section 1404(a). 4 Prior to this
statute, this doctrine had been held applicable to the federal courts,
and the Supreme Court had stated the relevant factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether or not the doctrine is to be applied.5
Because the doctrine of forum non conveniens called for dismissal of
the action, and possibly the concomitant loss of the right to bring
the action 6 (e.g., through the running of a statute of limitations),
the defendant had to show that the balance was "strongly in his
favor" to disturb the plaintiff's choice of forum.7
The fact that section 1404(a) was based on this doctrine, and
yet effected a radical departure by providing for transfer instead of
dismissal,8 caused much judicial controversy in the determination of
just how much "in accord" with the old doctrine the courts were to
(5th Cir. 1957). The fact that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
a court of coordinate jurisdiction, later said it did not, was not considered
material by the majority of the Court in the instant case. The Court points
out that the first decision did not purport to determine the jurisdiction of the
transferee forum (the Seventh Circuit). Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335,
340 n.9 (1960). The Court then states several reasons why the principles of
res judicata do not apply. The minority of the Court would rest the decision of
this case solely on this ground.
4 See the Reviser's Notes following 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958). Accord,
MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE ff 0.03(28), at 199 (1949).
5 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Among the considera-
tions stated by the Court are: (1) availability of compulsory process for
attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (2) relative ease of access to sources
of proof; (3) cost of obtaining attendance of the willing witnesses; (4) pos-
sibility of view of the premises if such would be appropriate to the action;
(5) other practical problems that make the trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive; (6) court congestion in certain centers; (7) jury duty as a burden
on the community which is a stranger to the litigation. Id. at 508.
6 All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952).
"That doctrine involves the dismissal of a case because the forum chosen by
the plaintiff is so completely inappropriate and inconvenient that it is better
to stop the litigation in the place where brought and let it start all over again
somewhere else. It is quite naturally subject to careful limitation for it not
only denies the plaintiff the generally accorded privilege of bringing an action
where he chooses, but makes it possible for him to lose out completely ....
Id. at 1011.
7 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
8 MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE 0.03(29), at 201-02 (1949).
. § 1404(a) does not authorize a dismissal for forum non conveniens; in-
stead, when this doctrine is invoked, the action is to be transferred to a proper
and more convenient venue." Ibid.
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act.9 Thus it had been held by a District Court in the Sixth Circuit
that the entire section was unavailable to plaintiffs because it was
based on forum non conveniens, and that doctrine was available only
to defendants. 10 On the other hand, a District Court in the Second
Circuit permitted a plaintiff to move under section 1404(a) because
now that transfer was provided for instead of dismissal, the doctrine
of balancing forums was not in itself inconsistent as applied to
plaintiffs.'i
The extent to which the courts have considered the section to
be a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens has influ-
enced their subsequent interpretations of the clause "where it might
have been brought." 12 Thus, it had been held in the Third Circuit
that subsequent express consent by defendants to a venue which was
not originally proper, either because of a lack of statutory venue in
the proposed forum or because the defendants were not amenable
to process, was sufficient to allow a transfer, thereby equating
"might have been brought" with "could now be brought." 13 How-
ever, it has been held in the Second Circuit that the defendant must
have been originally amenable to process in the proposed transferee
forum if section 1404(a) is to be available, precisely because the
doctrine of forum non conveniens presupposed at least two forums
in which the defendant was amenable to process.' 4 The argument
9 See, e.g., Anthony v. Kaufman, 193 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1951) (granting
defendant's motion for transfer although defendant had not originally been
amenable to process); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir.
1950) (denying plaintiff's motion to transfer to a forum where defendant was
not originally amenable to process); Troy v. Poorvu, 132 F. Supp. 864 (D.C.
Mass. 1955) (granting plaintiff's motion to transfer despite defendant's lack
of amenability to process in the transferee forum); Rogers v. Halford, 107
F. 'Supp. 295 (E.D. Wis. 1952) (denying plaintiff's motion because defendant
was not amenable to process in the transferee forum). However, the doctrine
of forum non conveniens had been held inapplicable to cases arising under
federal acts having their own venue provisions. United States v. National
City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 (1948) (Clayton Act); Baltimore & O.R.R.
v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941) (FELA). But § 1404(a) was held applicable to
"any civil action," including those formerly out of the range of forum non
conveniens. Ex parle Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949) (FELA); United States
v. National City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78 (1949) (Clayton Act).
20 Barnhart v. John B. Rogers Producing Co., 86 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ohio
1949) (plaintiff's raising of the doctrine of forum non conveniens would
amount to a motion to dismiss).
"1 Dufek v. Rotux Distrib. Co., 125 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
12 See cases cited note 9 supra.
13 Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1951). "The
difference between the phrase 'might have been brought' of Section 14 04 (a)
and that employed in this opinion, 'could now be brought,' is no more than one
of tense and grammar, the imperfect subjunctive as compared to the pluperfect
subjunctive. Surely Congress did not intend the effect of an important
remedial statute to turn upon tense or a rule of grammar." Id. at 114. Accord,
Anthony v. Kaufman, 193 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1951). Both cases involved mo-
tions by the defendants.
14 Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950) (motion was
1960 ]
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that the mere filing of a complaint was equivalent to "bringing" the
action was rejected. 15
Chief Judge Magruder, in In re Josephson,'6 took the position
that if the proposed transferee forum had jurisdiction of the subject
matter and venue, regardless of the defendant's original amenability
to process, the controlling factors should be "convenience" and the
"interest of justice." 17 Since the promulgation of the section, this
pattern of conflicting decisions has recurred constantly throughout
the federal courts.' 8
The Supreme Court in the instant case directly encountered two
major problems vexing the lower courts, i.e., the precise grammatical
meaning of "might have been brought," 19 and the elements required
for a forum to be one where the action "might have been brought." 20
Clearly, under this decision, no subsequent waiver of lack of venue
or surrender to process by the defendant will suffice to effect a
transfer under section 1404(a) on the theory that "might have been
brought" means "could now be brought." 21
made by planitiff to transfer to a forum where the defendant was not orig-
inally amenable to process).
15 Ibid. The fact that "a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court" (FED. R. Civ. P. 3) caused plaintiffs to argue that since they
could have filed the complaint without serving process on the defendant, the
action "might have been brought." The court held that while "filing" was
equivalent to "commencement," neither sufficed for the "bringing" of an action
under § 1404(a). Accord, Rogers v. Halford, 107 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Wis.
1952). Contra, Otto v. Hirl, 89 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
16218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954).
17 This case, on a defendant's motion, represents a compromise between the
two extremes. On the one hand it rejects the necessity for original amen-
ability to process in the transferee forum. Theoretically, perhaps, such an
interpretation could work a hardship by forcing a plaintiff out of a forum
where he could have litigated, into one where he cannot, simply because the
defendant is not amenable to process. Judge Magruder points out that in
reality this would not happen for two reasons: (1) if process is effected in
the transferor forum, it will remain effective since the transfer sends the case
"as is" to the transferee forum; or, (2) if process is not effected in the
transferor forum, the "interest of justice" would prevent transfer.
On the other hand, it requires that the transferee forum be one originally
having jurisdiction and proper venue, although there is dictum to the effect
that § 1404(a) also authorizes transfer to a forum not having statutory venue
provided that the defendants, who might have objected to the lack of venue
originally, waive that objection.
is See cases cited note 9 supra.
19 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). "Petitioners' 'thesis' and sole
claim is that § 1404(a) . . . should be broadly construed, and, when so con-
strued, the phrase 'where it might have been brought' should be held to relate
not only to the time of the bringing of the action, but also to the time of the
transfer .. " Id. at 342.
20 "We agree with the Seventh Circuit that: 'If when a suit is com-
menced, plaintiff has a right to sue in that district, independently of the wishes
of defendant, it is a district 'where [the action] might have been brought.'"
Id. at 344.
21 "[W]e think the dissenting opinion of Judges Hastie and McLaughlin in
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Likewise, it seems clear that transfer is no longer possible under
section 1404(a) unless the proposed transferee forum was one in
which venue originally lay, and where the defendant was amenable
to process in the first instance .22 In short, the Court has ruled that
unless the plaintiff could have brought the action in the proposed
transferee forum just as he brought it in the present (transferor)
forum, section 1404(a) is not applicable.
The Court's rejection of the argument that "might have been
brought" is the equivalent of "could now be brought" is sound
enough. Even the judiciary should not be able to twist the "plain
words" of a statute to such an extent.
It is difficult, however, to see such a great distortion of "plain
words" in interpreting the word "might," on a defendant's motion,
to mean a forum where the plaintiff could have brought the action
if the defendant had surrendered to process or consented to the venue.
Such an interpretation is consistent with the defendant's traditional
prerogative to waive lack of venue, 23 obviates the problem of extra-
territorial senice of process (since the interpretation applies only to
defendant's motion), places more weight upon "convenience" and
the "interest of justice," and is "in accord" with the doctrine of
forum non conveniens by giving the defendant a slight advantage in
respect to a remedy which was previously exclusively his own.
Instances might be imagined where such an interpretation per se
could work a hardship on the plaintiff.24 There are, however, other
limiting words in section 1404(a) 25 which should prevent such a
hardship. If the defendant shows such compelling reasons of
"convenience" and "justice" despite the fact that the action, if orig-
inally brought in the proposed forum, would have been subject to
objection on the grounds of improper venue or lack of amenability
to process, why should these reasons be totally disregarded? The
holding of the Court seems, indeed, to imply a lack of confidence
in the ability of the lower courts to properly balance the interests of
the parties in the light of "convenience" and "justice." 26
Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (C.A. 3d Cir.), correctly
answered this contention: '. .. In the normal meaning of words this language
of Section 1404(a) directs the attention of the judge who is considering a
transfer to the situation which existed when the suit was instituted.'" Id.
at 343.
2 ,,... and it is immaterial that the defendant subsequently [makes him-
self subject, by consent, waiver of venue and personal jurisdiction defenses
or otherwise, to the jurisdiction of some other forum].'" Id. at 344.
23 See MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE 0.03(28), at 172-73
(1949): "[V]enue . . . is a privilege personal to each defendant, which he
can and does waive unless he makes proper and timely objection...
24 See note 17 .mpra.
-528 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958): "For the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice . .. ."' (Emphasis added.)
26 See Justice Frankfurter's remark that ". . . this argument against transfer
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Perhaps the majority felt that such an interpretation would
result in a greater divergence from the doctrine of forum non
conveniens than the wording of the section warrants.27  Nonetheless,
at present, if section 1404(a) is to be available, the proposed trans-
feree forum must be one over which the court has jurisdiction and
venue, and where the defendant was originaly amenable to process. 28
Any wider extension of the availability of transfers must now
depend upon clearer legislative pronouncement.
X
LABOR LAW - INDUCEMENT OF SUPERVISOR PERMITTED BY
AMENDED SECTION 8(b) (4).-A subcontractor without a union con-
tract was employed at two different construction sites. At the first
site, the general contractor operated under a union agreement re-
quiring observance of union rules ' in all subcontracts. A superin-
tendent at the site had full authority over these subcontracts, as well
as the authority to hire and fire, to hear grievances, and to handle
routine operational problems. The subcontractor employed suspended
union members and did not observe union conditions, which facts
were brought to the attention of the superintendent by an agent of
the union. The superintendent cancelled the subcontract. At the
second site, the subcontractor was removing dirt in trucks driven
by non-union personnel. Union officers told the contractors that
union drivers would not work with non-union drivers, and, as a
result, the subcontractor's non-union trucks were barred from the
in situations like the present implies distrust in the ability and character of
district judges to hold the balance . . . ." Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335,
368 (1960) (dissenting opinion to case No. 26, Sullivan v. Behimer).
27 In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), the Court had stated:
"In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play,
it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to
process. . . ." Id. at 506-07 (dictum). Considering the wording of the sec-
tion and its admitted formulation "in accord" with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in the light of this statement strengthens the majority view.
28 But see Continental Grain Co. v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 364 U.S. 19
(1960). Here, a barge and its owner were libelled in admiralty. The Court
allowed transfer to a forum where the owner was originally amenable to
process, but where in rem jurisdiction over the barge was originally unavailable.
The Court reasoned, however, that this was really a single civil action against
the owner, although the barge was considered as a separate party through a
fiction of admiralty law. Thus compelling reasons of "convenience" and
"interest of justice" were allowed to override the fiction. Mr. Justice
Whittaker, who wrote the majority opinion in the instant case, insisted, in
his dissenting opinion that the holding of the instant case should control.
I The union required employment of union members at the union pay scale.
[ VOL. 35
